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Surname					Other names				
Pearson Edexcel									
International									
Advanced Level									
Centre Number					Candidate Number				
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History									
International Advanced Subsidiary									
Paper 4: International Study with Interpretations									
Option 1C: The World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1943–90									
Sample assessment material for first teaching September 2015 Time: 2 hours							Paper Reference WHI04/1C		
You must have: Source booklet (enclosed)								Total Marks	

Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer the question in Section A and **ONE** question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
– *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
– *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ►

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SECTION B

**Answer ONE question in Section B on the option for which you have been prepared.
You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.**

EITHER

- 2** How accurate is it to say that the nuclear arms race did little to restrain the Cold War policies of the superpowers in the years 1953–64?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

OR

- 3** How far do you agree that neither the USA nor the Soviet Union were seriously committed to Détente in the 1970s?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)

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Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number: **Question 2** ☒ **Question 3** ☒

Area with horizontal dotted lines for writing answers.

[The live question paper will contain nine more pages of answer lines.]

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 25 MARKS

TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS

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Pearson Edexcel
International Advanced Level

History

International Advanced Subsidiary

Paper 4: International Study with Interpretations

Option 1C: The World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1943–90

Sample assessment material for first teaching
September 2015
Source Booklet

Paper Reference

WHI04/1C

Do not return this source booklet with the question paper.

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Extracts for use with Section A.

Extract 1: From Melvyn P. Leffler, *The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48*, published in 1984.

<p>The dynamics of the Cold war are easier to understand when one grasps the American conception of national security. This included a strategic sphere of influence in the Western hemisphere, domination of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, access to the markets and resources of Eurasia, and nuclear superiority. Challenges to this concept of national security were certain to provoke a firm American response. This occurred initially when decisions were made in favour of the Truman doctrine, Marshall Plan, military assistance, Atlantic alliance, and German and Japanese rehabilitation. The 'loss' of China, Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, and the North Korean attack on South Korea intensified the perception of a national security threat. Truman responded with military assistance to south-east Asia, a decision to build the hydrogen bomb, direct military intervention in Korea, a commitment to station troops permanently in Europe, expansion of the American alliance system, and a massive US rearmament programme.</p>	5
<p>One might wonder whether America's own conception of national security tended, perhaps unintentionally, to create anxieties and provoke countermeasures from a proud, insecure and suspicious USSR government. The Soviet Union was legitimately apprehensive about the rehabilitation of traditional enemies and the development of foreign bases on the periphery of the Soviet homeland.</p>	10
<p></p>	15
<p></p>	20

Extract 2: From Jonathan Haslam, *Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall*, published in 2011.

Stalin's reading of the international situation was intimately linked to Marxist-Leninist ideology, most notably the assumption that war under capitalism was inevitable. He wanted Soviet dominance over Europe with Germany under foot, France counted out, and Britain confined to the periphery. Quite apart from Marxist-Leninist considerations, the Soviets firmly believed that Russia had a right to dominate the entire continent after the blood sacrifice of 1941–45. And to those less ideologically committed, the idea of imperial expansion was attractive enough. 5

Predominance over Eastern Europe could have been secured, as it had been in previous centuries, without necessarily threatening Western Europe but only if the expansion of Russian power did not necessarily also mean the expansion of the communist system. It was this that so stirred Churchill and then Bevin into halting the United States' drift back into isolation. In this sense, ideology was also critical to Western assessments of the threat the USSR posed. For Stalin, pressure on Western Europe was essential to keeping the US out of the continent and by blatant exertion of pressure – through the Cominform and the Berlin blockade – he gravely miscalculated. His serious miscalculation over Korea in 1950 then ensured the US stayed and rearmed capitalist Germany as well. 10 15

Acknowledgements

Extract 1 is from Melvyn P. Leffler, *The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48*, 1984.

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